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A Note On Retrospectively Rated
Insurance and Federal Income Taxation
By DONALD ARTHUR WINSLOW*
When contracting for a typical insurance policy, the insured
normally knows the amount that must be paid to the insurance
company regardless of the amount of the losses experienced under
the policy.' But insurance is not so simple for a large business
because it is exposed to numerous risks. In such a case, the amount
of potential losses can become so great that either the insured or a
potential insurer can state with reasonable certainty that a fair
number of risks will mature into losses. 2 Any premum charged by
an insurance company must be sufficient to cover the losses ex-
pected or likely to occur plus other charges and an amount for
profit. Similarly, because the expected losses will be predictable
within a relatively narrow range, neither the would-be insured nor
the insurer should be willing to pay much more or receive much
less in premium payments than the losses expected to occur; the
would-be insured likely would not insure the business' risks rather
than pay too high a prenuum.3 Moreover, the two parties might
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, 1990-1991; Associate
Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky. A.B. 1975, Umversity of Califorma at Los
Angeles; M.B.A. 1979, Johnson Graduate School of Management; J.D. 1980, Cornell Law
School. The author gratefully acknowledges the numerous helpful comments of Professors
Norman Stem and Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and William H. Bradley, Esq. on an earlier
draft of this Article.
' A. Wa=Tn, THE EcONOMIC THmoRY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 89 (1951); M. FRIED-
MN, PRICE THEoRY 80-81 (1976).
2 A. Wiaaarr, supra note 1, at 72-75.
See id. at 75-76; R. GOsHAY, CORPORATE Sair-INsURANCE AND RISK RETENTION
PLANs 42 (1964); H. SNmEa Risk Management and General Insurance Problems, in RISK
MANAGEmENT 123, 134 (H.W Smder ed. 1964).
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have opposing expectations regarding the range of expected losses.
Retrospectively rated insurance offers the possibility of bringing
these parties together4 through flexible premium amounts, where
neither party faces unacceptable choices. The insurance company is
not faced with likely and burdensome losses and the insured does
not face the prospect of grossly overpaying for the coverage that it
needs.
Because the insured will pay an amount that corresponds some-
what with its losses, retrospectively rated insurance can be compared
to cash flow plans that do not involve a third party insurance
company For example, self-insurance' and captive insurance6 are
designed to arrange for the payment of liabilities that will mature
from the risks of a business, while retaining the use of the funds
that would otherwise be used to pay a premium to an insurance
company 7 The tax goal of these plans is to achieve a federal income
tax8 deduction for the losses or premiums. These cash flow plans
have been the subject of substantial debate among commentators,
courts and occasionally Congress, with results in cases and statutes
generally disallowing a deduction for the liability or premium in
question. 9 Retrospectively rated plans work similarly since the in-
4 See R. GosilY, supra note 3, at 42; Risk Management and General Insurance
Problems, supra note 3, at 134.
1 Under a self-insurance plan, "[a]mounts that might otherwise be paid as a premium
to an-insurance company remain under the control of the business, where they can continue
to produce a return for the business until the losses are paid." Bradley & Winslow, Self-
Insurance Plans and Captive Insurance Companes-A Perspective on Recent Tax Develop-
ments, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'y 217, 218 (1985).
6 "Captive insurance companies are designed to secure the benefits of tax deferral
through the creation and use of a subsidiary insurance or reinsurance corporation. "Id.
7 See generally id. at 217-19.
* References to I.R.C. sections are to the current version of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 unless otherwise specified. References to Treasury Regulations are to the
regulations currently in force, unless otherwise specified.
9 Captives have generated a still growing body of authorities. Winslow, Tax Avoidance
and the Definition of Insurance: The Continuing Examination of Captive Insurance Com-
panies, 40 CASn W REs. L. Rta 79, 81 n.8 (1989). The courts generally have demed- the
deduction for single parent corporations paying premiums to captives. See, e.g., Clougherty
Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'g, 84 T.C. 948 (1985);'
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986); Stearns-Roger Corp.
v. United States, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985); Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g, 71 T.C. 400 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct.
555 (1985). Occasional cases have allowed deduction of captive premium expensebased on
unusual facts. See, e.g., Humana Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197 (1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989) (brother-sister corporations can shift and
distribute risk); Crawford Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(captive owned by several parties); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010 (1987) (a
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sured pays an amount that corresponds to its losses and the pre-
mium payment may be delayed to approximate loss payments. In
the retro context, the insured deducts as a business expense an
amount equal to the insurance premium.' 0 These plans present tax
issues similar to those found in the other cash flow plans, such as
self-insurance and captives." Thus, they possess similar potential
for conflict between taxpayers and the government.
Retrospectively rated insurance arrangements are the primary
means by which a commercial insurer can give the insured a portion
of the cash flow advantages of the self-insurance and captive ar-
rangements.' 2 The retro arrangement predominates as the insurance
vehicle used by sizeable businesses.' 3 Yet it is seldom mentioned in
the trade magazines 4 or in the legal literature. 5
wholly owned captive that insures unrelated third party risks may, at some point, meet the
risk shifting and risk distribution standard) (dicta) aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 90-2
U.S.T.C. 50,496 (3d Cir. 1990). Commentators have offered widely divergent views and
theories on the captive issue. Winslow, supra, at 80 & n.3. See, e.g., Barker, Federal Income
Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA. TAx Rav 267 (1986) (deduction only if captive owned
by persons other than insured); Bradley & Winslow, supra note 5 (deduction if captive not
sham); Knight & Knight, Disregarding the Separate Corporate Entity of Captive Insurance
Companies: A Violation of the Moline Properties Doctrine?, 14 J. CORP. L. 399 (1989)
(Moline Properties supports deduction); O'Brien & Tung, Captive Off-Shore Insurance Cor-
porations, 31 NYU INsT. ON FED. TAX'N 665 (1973) (deduction if captive car pay losses);
Sachs, Principles for Taxing Foreign Captive Insurance Companies, 1 Am. J. TAx POL'Y 45
(1982) (deduction where financial ability to handle risks); Singer, When the Internal Revenue
Service Abuses the System: Captive Insurance Companies and the Delusion of the Economic
Family, 10 VA. TAx REv. 113 (1990) (IRS handling of this issue has been abusive in developing
illegitimate doctrine); Taylor, Taxing Captive Insurance: A New Solution for an Old Problem,
42 TAx LAw. 859 (1989) (examine issues from insurer's side); Wiislow, supra (either result
is theoretically justified, but denial of deduction must be based on tax avoidance principles
and a finding that the business purpose of the arrangement is outweighed by the tax
avoidance).
The self-insurance issue was settled by amendment of the Internal Revenue Code. The
nondeductibility of self-insurance was eroded several years ago by cases allowing accrual of
deductions for uncontested workers' compensation liabilities that were still unpaid. Winslow,
supra, at 90 n.46. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United States,-717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983);
Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1975). For a
complete exposition on this issue, see Bradley & Winslow, supra note 5. The economic
performance standard was put into the Code, in part, m order to delay deductions on account
of tort and workers' compensation claims until payment. See I.R.C. § 461(h). See also
Winslow, supra, at 90-91.
,o See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a). See also Winslow, supra note 9, at 80.
See Winslow, supra note 9, at 86-88, 138, 159-62 & n.240.
See Johnson, Retrospective Planning for Future Profits, RiSK MANAGEMENT, April
1989, at 69.
'" Brief of Appellant at 44-45, Stearns-Roger Corp., 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985)
(based on expert witness testimony); Winslow, supra note 9, at 138 & n.239.
4 For examples referring to the concept, see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 12; Davis, IRS
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This Article is the author's third in a series on cash flow plans.16
It builds on earlier works by analyzing business expense deductions
with respect to premiums paid under retrospectively rated insurance
policies, which present an unusual context for determining the
elements of the definition of insurance. It first describes the ele-
ments of the definition of insurance. 17 Next, it describes retrospec-
tively rated insurance plans in some additional detail and reviews
their history under the tax law 18 The Article then suggests that the
deductibility of such premiums should be determined through a tax
avoidance analysis 19 similar to that which the author has suggested
for analysis of captive insurance arrangements, rather than a tech-
mcal definition of insurance. 20 This approach should lead to the
conclusion that some such arrangements can generate a premium
expense deduction, while many used in practice do not.
I. DEscRPnoN OF RETROSPECTIVELY RATED INSURANCE
The premium amount under a retrospectively rated arrangement
comes from a formula. The formula which is present in the contract
at the outset determines the stated premium amount from losses
expected for the insured. The premium amount is regularly adjusted
to reflect actual losses throughout the period of coverage.
Such a formula for retrospective rating must account for several
charges. Expected losses are covered by a loss conversion factor.
That factor also includes claims handling expenses, state taxes and
any federal excise tax. In addition, the contract likely will call for
a charge denominated a basic premium. Within the basic premium
are charges for administrative expenses, plus an amount compen-
For examples referring to the concept, see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 12; Davis, IRS
Targets Retrospectively Rated Insurance Programs, CASH FLow, April 1987, at 37, 38.
11 For works discussing retrospectively rated plans and then focusing on other cash
flow arrangements, see Winslow, supra note 9, at 86-87, 138, 150-62; Note, Federal Taxation
Concepts in Corporate Risk Assumptions: Self-Insurance, the Trust, and the Captive Insur-
ance Company, 46 FomHsAm L. REv. 781, 799-803 (1978).
16 Bradley & Winslow, supra note 5; Winslow, supra note 9. This Article does not
develop anew many of the background aspects and issues of cash flow programs. If the
instant discussion appears to be brief, then please refer to the two earlier works. An effort
has been made to minimize repetition among these works but some duplication has undoubt-
edly crept in, as should be expected with works touching upon similar topics by the same
author.
" See infra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
," See infra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
"9 See infra notes 51-130 and accompanying text.
20 See Winslow, supra note 9, passim.
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sating the insurer for bearing the risk that losses will rise beyond
the point where the premium can be adjusted to reflect additional
losses.
2'
Retrospectively rated insurance comes in a great variety of
forms. 22 The financial attractiveness to the insured of these forms
varies greatly A common and fairly uncomplicated form, giving
the insured the largest financial advantage, is the "paid loss retro."
Under that form the insured pays the premium amount to the
insurer when and to the extent actual losses arise and must be paid.
An alternative retro plan, with potentially much less freedom,
restricts the range of possible retrospective adjustment of the pre-
mium amount. The premium in this form is thus confined to fixed
mimmum and maximum limits. In addition, the obligation to pay
the premium may be freed from the payment of losses. If it is
desired to defer payment of the premium, a schedule of fixed terms
can be provided by a note from the insured to the insurer. Use of
a note attempts to isolate the insurance and financing parts of the
arrangement.
The financing aspect of this last alternative can be handled
differently The note might be replaced by an investment credit
mechanism. This variation calls for the premium to be paid at the
time of the contract. That amount should approach the principal
amount of the note used in connection with a deferred premium
retro to pay the stated premium. The insured also gets "credit" for
increases upon the "loss fund" held by the insurer. This "invest-
ment credit" accrues at a set rate on the fund. The rate applies to
the premium amount (less returns), plus accumulated credits, less
the basic premium, premium taxes, loss payments and formula loss
expenses? The "credit" used in connection with this variation
shows the insured who has paid the premium amount at the time
21 See generally R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, INSURANCE PINCIP.s AND PRACTICES 380
(5th ed. 1966); E. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 94 (3d ed. 1982).
22 For discussion of the possible variations, see R. RIEGEL & J. MuILER, supra note 21,
at 378-81.
23 See generally Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-48-022 (Aug. 27, 1982); Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 86-04-072
(Oct. 30, 1985).
The advantage in the investment credit variation of retros is present only if the loss
payments occur at the time and in the amount expected. Should payments of losses occur as
estimated, no additional amounts from the insured will be needed by the insurance company.
The credit formula will otherwise dampen any positive increment or increase amount of the
refund. The insured may, however, lose the desired advantage of this retro alternative if
losses are greater than were expected or are paid faster than was expected. In such cases,
the insurer cannot earn the anticipated return on the "loss fund."
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of the contract that it retains benefits from funds transferred to the
insurance company, even if it does not delay payment of the pre-
mium as in the first two retro variations discussed above.
In order to analyze these retrospective plans in light of the
general insurance authorities, it will be necessary to review the
theoretical literature on the plans and trace their history in the tax
law
II. THE DEFINITION OF INSURANCE AND RETROSPECTIVELY RATED
ARRANGEIvMENTS
Economics and insurance scholars have written about the the-
ories behind retrospectively rated policies for well over 40 years,
but little consensus has emerged. The majority, however, tend to
find some insurance element within the plans and conclude that
such arrangements can be considered insurance.
Under long established doctrine,24 insurance is considered to be
present for tax purposes if there is risk shifting and risk distribu-
tion.2 Risk shifting generally means that the insured has transferred
the risk from itself to another party, the insurer. 26 Risk distribution,
although sometimes less clearly understood than risk shifting, refers
to the pooling process in which the insurer, through the collection
of premiums from numerous insureds, spreads the risks across the
body of those insureds. 27
In this light of insurance theory from the tax law, and using
concepts similar to those used in the tax authorities, a fair number
of writers cast some doubt upon the characterization of retros as
insurance, or accept that conclusion only grudgingly Some writers
in this group describe retros as partial self-insurance,U referring to
the payment of losses with the range of premium variability Others
treat the concepts as less deserving of an insurance characterization,
sometimes referring to it as "quasi self-insurance" and attempting
See generally Winslow, supra note 9, at 93-101.
25 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
Id. at 541-42; Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 C.B. 56.
27 Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1950).
M. GREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 758 (1968) ("employer becomes a partial self-
insurer, but he uses the commercial insurer to limit his losses"); A. MOWBRAY & R.
BLANCHARD, INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 347 (4th ed.
1955) ("What retrospective rating amounts to is self insurance within limits, and an agreement
that the insurer will give the usual service to the risk, particularly in settlement of losses.").
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to isolate the insurance elements m such a plan.29 All of these
essentially negative views of the issue apparently were developed
because until the losses exceed the amount corresponding to the
maximum premium, the insurer does not bear any losses because
the premium adjusts to reflect the losses up to that point.30 Thus,
these writers often conclude that the insured has not bought insur-
ance except to the extent its premum cannot exceed a stated
maximum 31 or the amount of insurance increases as the maximum
premium decreases.3 2 They also sometimes refer to the insurers'
indemnity or agreements to provide claims services as insurance
elements. 33 Ultimately, these commentators conclude with the qual-
ification that retros are insurance only to the extent that they have
such features.
Other commentators are more positive about these arrange-
ments. Some writers simply describe the retrospective policies as an
insurance rating device.34 These writers typically do not discuss
2 See R. RiEGH & J. MILER, supra note 21, at 380; H. DENENBERG, R. Euaaps, W
HotmA.N, C. KudE, J. MAtotN & W SNMER, RISK & INSURANCE 389 (1964) [hereinafter
DENENBERO]; G. MIcHELBACHER, CASUALTY INsURANCE PRINcIPS 243 (2d ed. 1942); Wil-
liams, An Analysis of Current Experience and Retrospective Rating Plans, J. FiNANCE, Dec.
1954, at 377, 399-401.
1 Insurance writers of this view have remarked upon the undeniable economic resem-
blance of retros to self-insurance combined with excess coverage.
First, the manager must be able to compare the desirability of a retro-
spectively rated insured [sic] plan with a self-insured plan in which excess
coverage is carried. Since the protection provided an insured by these two
approaches is often very similar, the decision will be strongly influenced and
perhaps even determined by cost considerations. The insurance manager, there-
fore, must be able to compute the cost of retrospectively rated plans under
various loss assumptions.
Risk Management and General Insurance Problems, supra note 3, at 134. A like comparison
to captive insurance has also been made.
The large corporate risk market is permeated with "special," "service," and
other types of insurance plans so retrospective in nature, at least for the casualty
and workmen's compensation risks, that the term "retrospective" in the risk
manager's vocabulary has largely been replaced with the term "insurer reten-
tion," reflecting the nature of the competitive process in the placement of these
plans.
Goshay, Captive Insurance Companies, in RISK MANAGEmaENT 80, 111 (H.W Snider ed.
1964).
" H. DENENBERG, supra note 29, at 389; G. MICBELBACiER, supra note 29, at 243;
Williams, supra note 29, at 400.
2 R. RiEGEL & J. MLER, supra note 21, at 380.
13 See G. MNICHsLAcHER, supra note 29, at 243; R. RPoEL & J. MILHER, supra note
21, at 380; Williams, supra note 29, at 400.
14 S. S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK & R. CuIm, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSUANCE 662-63
(2d ed. 1976); J. ATnEARN, RISK AND INSURANCE 403 (1977); Clark, Problems of Insuring
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specific insurance features of retrospective policies. Nevertheless,
their discussions of such plans in the context of other forms of
insurance suggest that they do not take exception to the grouping
of retros with insurance arrangements generally Other writers refer
to retrospectively rated plans as similar to "cost plus" contracts
with the major difference being the limited range of premium
variability 31 Still others recognize that they have been labelled as
"cost plus" plans but conclude that they are in fact "protected
profit sharing plans" between the insureds and the insurers.3 6 Such
comments run to the extreme of totally denying the presence of
self-insurance between the minimum and maximum premium
amounts. Although the employer has complete legal and financial
responsibility for losses in the case of self-insurance, in retrospec-
tively rated plans legal responsibility for all losses is on the insurer.
37
Finally, two authors have concluded (with little explanation) that
the use of set nummum and maximum premiums causes the ar-
rangement to be insurance by transfer of risk and pooling of
expenses, so that those who incur loss are reimbursed by those who
do not.38
Thus, there is substantial support among scholarly works for
the conclusion that retro arrangements constitute insurance under
various rationales. 39 Indeed, that seems to have been how the issue
was initially treated in the tax law for several decades.
Domestic Risks in the Domestic and Foreign Insurance Markets, in Risk Management 66, 75
(H.W Snider ed. 1964).
11 E. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURAN E 94 (3d ed. 1982). See also
GosHAY, supra note 3, at 42 n.10 ("Retrospective plans, despite their limited 'cost plus'
nature, have significant insurance features.").
J. MAGEE & D. BicKELrAurPT, GENERAL INsURANCE 436 (7th ed. 1964); J. MAGEE,
PROPERTY INsURANCE 750-51 (3d ed. 1955).
C. Kuu', CASUALTY INSURANCE: AN ANALYsis oF HAZARDs, Poucais, ComPANiEs
AND RATES 523 (3d ed. 1956) [hereinafter KuuP]; R. GosHAY, supra note 3, at 42. Tlis
conclusion was much more strongly stated than in Dean Kulp's earlier edition, where he
simply stated that, "[t]he only difference between [a retro with a maximum premium] and a
separate aggregate stop -loss contract is that in the latter the insured retains full legal
responsibility for losses; here it rests with the insurer." C. Kun', CASUALTY INSURANCE: AN
ANALYiS OF HAZARDs, PoLcins, ComPAsAms AND RATES 579 (rev. ed. 1942) [hereinafter Kuu'
RvisED EDmON]. One still rmght doubt whether he intended the broad conclusion described
in the text since he elsewhere stated that the plan "retain[ed] the insurance principle by
limiting both the maximum and mnumum prermums." Id. at 519.
33 I. PFEFTER & D. KLOCK, PERSPECTIVES ON INSURANCE 340 (1974).
39 An expert witness often used by the government in insurance tax cases testified in
one captive insurance case that the majority of retros consist of insurance combined with a
structured arrangement for paying for losses. Brief of Appellant, at 44 & n.26, Stearns-Roger
Corp. v. United States, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Winslow, supra note 9, at
138 n.239.
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RETRO ARRANGEMENTS
A. Origins in World War II
Although not a new idea at the time, retrospective insurance
arrangements rose to significance during the early 1940's. 40 Retro-
spective rate making grew out of a "germ of an idea" in 1932, and
was applied as a modified system of limited self-rating for relatively
large risks. 4' This concept was developed for the war effort in a
plan covering contractors' workmen's compensation, employers'
liability, automobile liability, and comprehensive liability hazards
under a special United States War Department Plan.42 This plan
was implemented as a means of reducing the costs of the war effort
by giving insureds coverage essentially "at cost."1
43
The insurance nature of these contracts generally was not ques-
tioned for tax purposes at that time. The contemporary writings
evidence an unquestioning acceptance of the contracts as insur-
ance. 44 The most pressing tax question concerned the so-called
return premiums under the plan. This question arose after the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942 and was addressed in the
Treasury Department's Regulations. The insurance companies wanted
those premiums to be treated as "unearned premiums" and hence
deducted from gross premiums in arriving at net underwriting in-
come. The regulations accommodated this concern by providing
that,
In computing "premums earned on insurance contracts during
the taxable year" the amount of the unearned premium shall
include (2) liability for return premiums under a rate credit
or retrospective rating plan based on experience, such as the "War
40 G. MICH-LBACHER, supra note 29, at 243; Kuur REVISED EDMON, supra note 37, at
574. Dean Kulp concluded that, "[b]oth in theory and fact the result is surely insurance
whether costs are figured prospectively or retrospectively." Id. He asserted that, "[tlhe
retrospective is the method of the earliest attempts at pooling hazards, the assessment society
or group." Id. The loss experience of a group is, however, not the relevant experience of
the retros examined in this Article, which concerns the loss experience of the individual
insured.
,1 KuLP, supra note 37, at 519.
42 Kuwa REmVsED EDMON, supra note 37, at 576 n.64.
" See Tye, An Analysis of the Comprehensive Insurance Rating Plan, 1943 INs. L. J.
3, 3-4 (1943); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,269 (March 15, 1973).
- See Tye, Federal Taxation of Insurance Companies and Their Problems, 21 TAxEs
594 (1943); Tye, supra note 43, at 3, 4.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Department Insurance Rating Plan," and which return premiums
are therefore not earned premiums.
4
1
Thus, the government imtially treated these contracts as insurance
and appeared to resolve the one principal tax issue in favor of
taxpayers.
B. The Unearned Premium Issue
For some years this understanding remained in place. Then, the
Service raised an issue regarding the unearned premiums, and this
inquiry also led to a collateral development of principal importance
for our purposes. In the course of its work on the unearned pre-
mium issue, the Service provided some very general standards re-
lating to the insurance nature of the contracts.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the Service began to take the position
that the potential (i.e., contingent) retrospective refund was not an
unearned premium. It sought to disallow deduction of that amount
from gross premiums in determining net underwriting income of
the issuer. In Revenue Ruling 67-225, it reasoned that the Treasury
Regulations meant that "a retrospective rating credit may be de-
ducted in computing premiums earned only when the liability there-
for becomes fixed and reasonably ascertainable in amount in the
same sense that there is a fixed liability to return the unearned
premium upon cancellation."46 This position delayed the availability
of the credit by conditiomng its timing on the "all events" test of
the Treasury Regulations under section 461 govermng accrual of
liabilities generally 47
45 T.D. 5236, 1943 C.B. 519, 523-24 (March i, 1943) (emphasis added). For the current
version of the regulation, see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.832-4(a)(3) (as amended in 1988).
- Rev. Rul. 67-225, 1967-2 C.B. 238, 242. For a published ruling and Techmcal Advice
Memorandum following Rev. Rul. 67-225 on a similar issue, see Rev. Rul. 70480, 1970-2
C.B. 142 and Tech. Adv. Mem. 7003271130A (March 27, 1970). Cf. Rev. Rul. 59-417, 1959-
2 C.B. 170 (stock casualty insurance company should include maximum premiums earned
during taxable year in its gross income and deduct the return premiums only in the year in
which the liability therefore accrues); Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 5602276130A (Feb. 27, 1956) (same).
See also Rev. Rul. 67-180, 1967-1 C.B. 172 (liability for retrospective rate credits based on
experience with respect to casualty insurance contracts issued by an accident department of
a life insurance company are treated as a reserve for dividends to policyholders rather than
unearned premiums or return premiums); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6705056220A (May 5, 1967) (same).
During this period, the Service gave private rulings opimng whether a particular plan was a
rate credit or retrospective rating plan based on experience, within the meamng of the
regulations. See Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 5710096020A (Oct. 9, 1957).
47 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) ("all events" fix fact of liability and amount determinable
with "reasonable accuracy"). See also Winslow, supra note 9, at 90.
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Taxpayers challenged this position in the courts. The dispositive
case, Bituminous Casualty Corp. v Commissioner,48 interpreted the
Treasury Regulations dealing with the unearned premium issue as
permitting insurers to treat estimated amounts returnable under a
retro as "unearned premiums." The court found that the regula-
tions originally were intended to make the same adjustments for
both tax and insurance accounting purposes. "Liability," as used
by the regulations denoted the insurance industry definition rather
than the meamng given it in the "all events" test governing accruied
deductions generally The Service later accepted this result by re-
voking the previously published ruling. 49
The unearned premium issue subsequently became uncontro-
versial. The Service gave private rulings with respect to it. The
Service ruled that retrospective refund reserves could be given the
treatment accorded to "unearned premium" reserves.
50
C. The Current Retro Issue-Insurance Characterization of the
Retro Contract
These early authorities indirectly bear on the current issues
facing retrospectively rated plans. They serve to illustrate the some-
what lengthy acceptance of such plans as insurance by the govern-
ment. Moreover, such rulings by the government also provided the
germ of a theory upon which such characterizations could be jus-
tified.
1. The Basic Framework of Issues
Whether retros constitute insurance contracts also determines
the deductibility of the insured's premium expense. This represents
the current tax issue for retros. As with captives, such a deduction
rests on the section 162 regulations that specify a business expense
deduction from gross income for "insurance premiums against fire,
storm, theft, accident or similar losses in the case of a business." 5'
" 57 T.C. 58 (1971).
0 Rev. Rul. 73-302, 1973-2 C.B. 220.
" Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 86-04-072 (Oct. 30, 1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-48-022 (Aug. 27, 1982).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a). For years, Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Commissioner,
27 T.C. 167 (1956), aff'd on other grounds, 251 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
875 (1958), was taken to support a general characterization of retros as "insurance." Midwest
Motor involved the proper year for an accrual deduction under the "all events" test. The
issue concerned the accrual of an adjustment in the retrospectively rated premium occasioned
by a particular claim arising from an accident in 1948 which resulted m a setting up of a
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Insurance premiums typically have been considered to generate
an accrual expense when incurred. The recent retro tax issue, re-
gardless of the payment features involved, thus, turns on whether
a retrospectively rated policy constitutes "insurance." 2 Some recent
developments, discussed below, complicate matters for premium
expense deductions under a deferred premium payment arrange-
ment, but the initial and basic question in all cases has been the
insurance characterization of the arrangement.
The authorities discussed above, considering whether a contract
is insurance, require that the contract shift risk. That characteri-
zation does not necessarily follow from the use of a policy from a
commercial insurer. 53 Given a variable premum to be paid to a
third party insurer, the tax issue for retros is: how much risk shifting
suffices to qualify a retrospectively rated contract as "insurance" ' 9
The authorities concermng the unearned premium issue char-
acterized the retro contracts. The Service must have agreed that a
retrospectively rated arrangement could be "insurance." That char-
acterization appeared to be present if the insurer could not adjust
the premium to correlate exactly premiums and losses. That possi-
reserve by the insurer in 1950 to cover the claim. The taxpayer deducted that expense in the
taxable year 1952, when the claim against the taxpayer was paid, and paid the adjusted
premium the next taxable year. The Service argued that the adjustment in the preamum
expense should have been accrued and deducted prior to those years, "conced[ing] that the
premium payment [was] a proper deduction." 27 T.C. at 186. The Tax Court found, in light
of the above facts-and the fact no recomputation of the premium was to occur after August
1951 unless the parties disagreed as to the amount of the reserve, that the premium expense
had accrued before the year in which the taxpayer claimed the deduction. Because it was.
assumed that the accrued premium expense arose from an insurance transaction, particularly
in light of the Service's concession just quoted, the case was thought to support the insurance
characterization of retrospectively rated policies.
As suggested by Midwest Motor, a retro, even if the retro constitutes insurance, involves
the further issue of the proper year of the deduction for the premium expense. Although
this accrual issue will be considered below, it should be noted that an insured reporting
income on an accrual basis must pass two tests to achieve a current deduction under I.R.C.
§ 461. First, the taxpayer must meet the "economic performance" test of section 461(h). If
the contract is one of insurance, economic performance generally takes place within the
policy period. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 875 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE & ADMi NEWS 1445, 1563. Second, the taxpayer must satisfy the "all events"
test, which allows a deduction "for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred
which determine the fact of the liability (for the prermum) and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2). See also I.R.C. § 461(h)(4).
52 The stated premium would be paid in the policy period. The case of a "deferred"
payment, which presents some special difficulties, will be discussed below.
51 Any of these plans will be analyzed according to its terms and substance. In-Helverng
v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S 531 (1941), the Supreme Court held that an arrangement involving a
large commercial insurer did not constitute "insurance" because it did not shift risk when
analyzed as a whole.
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bility of an insurance characterization logically extended to the
context of the deductibility of the premum expense.
54
2. Early Collateral Analysis Generated by the Unearned
Premium Issue
Revenue Ruling 67-225, 55 which is discussed above in connection
with the unearned premium issue, gave an early suggestion as to
how the Service might view this issue. In the course of that ruling,
the Service pointed to the need for restrictions on the adjustment
range for the premiums before a contract could be insurance. The
Service stated that such an adjustable premium must be "subject
to mmnmum and maximum limits thus guaranteeing on the one
end, that every premium paid by a policyholder takes into account
risk charges and loading elements and on the other end that the
contract is one of insurance rather than mere bookkeeping for a
fee.",56
The Service subsequently pursued this course in private rulings
dealing with "unearned premiums," after Revenue Ruling 73-302
revoked Revenue Ruling 67-225's position on that issue. 57 These
rulings deal with issues other than the deductibility of the premium,
but there is between the unearned premium and premium deducti-
bility inquiries a common issue: the characterization of retros as
insurance. The conclusions reached m both contexts should be the
same. In those private rulings on the unearned premium issue, the
Service found that since the policies called for restrictions on the
amount of possible premium adjustment, the insurers "assume[d]
a meaningful amount of insurance risk under the policy "58
These rulings failed to specify the permissible limits for premium
adjustments. But, if retros cannot be "insurance", these rulings
gave the Service a perfect opportunity to air such a view The
consistent treatment of the retros as "insurance" with respect to
the unearned premium issue well supported the notion that those
arrangements were insurance for other purposes, including deduct-
ibility of the premium expense, if meaningful limits were imposed
on premium variability
'4 See Note, supra note 15, at 800.
15 1967-2 C.B. 238.
56 Id. at 239.
See Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 86-04-072 (Oct. 30, 1985); Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 82-48-022 (Aug. 27,
1982).
" See Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 86-04-072 (Oct. 30, 1985); Pnv. Ltr. Rul. 82-48-022 (Aug. 27,
1982).
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This analysis gave some significant guidelines, but they were
not crystal clear. The Service's rulings implied that a retro not
limited in its premium adjustments would not be insurance. It
would, in substance, be self-insurance: the insured would essentially
pay its own losses. That result obtained in Steere Tank Lines, Inc.
v United States."9 The Steere Tank Lines decision involved the only
adjudicated instance prior to the 1980's of a scheme similar to a
retrospectively rated insurance contract lacking meaningful or sub-
stantial premium limits. Steere Tank Lines was apparently distinct
from the situations underlying the unearned premium issue rulings
because it involved an essentially unlimited retrospective adjustment
of the premium. That contract prevented any shift of the risk to
the insurer from the insured-taxpayer, except in the event of the
"insured's" insolvency Steere Tank Lines underscored the tendency
(already seen in the Service's rulings) to look for reasonable res-
trictions on the variability of premiums in determining vhether an
arrangement constitutes insurance.
By the early or mid-1980's, this collection of authorities sug-
gested three propositions relating to retros and a premium expense
deduction. First, the Service had abandoned the unearned premium
issue. Second, the Service, in the course of dealing with the un-
earned premium issue, had adopted a general standard for deter-
mining whether a retro contract constituted insurance, and that
stated standard provided some support for a premium expense
deduction with respect to those retro contracts approaching that
standard. Third, the Service apparently had no interest in question-
mg the Subchapter L treatment of insurance companies issuing retro
contracts. Such challenges would have seemed appropriate if retro
policies were not contracts of insurance.
" 76-2 U.S.T.C. 9526 (N.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 577 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979).
The government claimed the transaction in question, which had significant surety bond
elements, amounted at most to self-insurance. The taxpayer claimed that it was "a form of
retrospective policy." The Court of Appeals stated that:
In the present case, there was no shifting of the risk, since Steere [the taxpayer]
was obligated to pay all losses. The premium contract amount could be used
only to pay losses suffered by Steere or its owner-lessors, but Steere was
obligated to pay premums for its owner-lessors, so in effect, Steere's losses
were to be paid only out of a fund made up of prermums Steere had paid.
Thus, there was no risk distribution by Steere either.
557 F.2d at 280. The court drew additional support for this result from the fact that the
taxpayer received a surety bond rather than a "certificate of insurance."
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3. Change in Direction by the Service
In the 1980's the Service altered its approach to characterizing
retros. This change in course did not become apparent at once.
Only through use of Indsight is it possible to observe that the
signals of change surfaced early in that decade. For years, the
Service had seemed relatively satisfied to allow a premum expense
deduction for one insured under a retro arrangement if the retro-
spective rate adjustment was based on the loss experience of a
group of insureds. 60 An early sign that the Service had rethought
its positions appeared in a published ruling on this type of retro
issue. Nothing on the surface of that ruling challenged the notion
of insurance that had been derived from the unearned prenum
issue authorities of the Service.
In 1983, the Service issued this published ruling, Revenue Ruling
83-66,61 based on a cash method taxpayer who bought malpractice
insurance from a stock casualty company An annual policy was
issued under a master agreement between the insurance company
and the taxpayer's medical society A refund provision permitted a
refund of some amount of the prermum if the insurance company
paid fewer losses than expected. The Service ruled that the insured
could take a deduction for the prermum expense despite the refund
clause.
The deduction was sustained in this instance. But this ruling
shifted subtly from the previously understood position of the Serv-
ice. The reserve premium at issue consisted of the "difference
between the actuanally computed premium necessary to cover an-
ticipated losses based on the current trend in the malpractice area
and the premium necessary to cover malpractice losses if the insur-
ance company achieved a favorable loss experience for the group,"
apparently referring to the medical society as the "group." 62 The
Service ruled that the entire premium payment, consisting of the
reserve premium as well as the basic premium, shifted risks from
6* See generally Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-32-037 (May 9, 1979) (retro policies from insurer to
United States law firms not discussing risk-shifting).
"1983-1 C.B. 43.
It has been asserted that this ruling involved a mechanism "which based the amount
of any retrospective rate credit on the aggregate loss experience of the insurance com-
pany. " Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-37-003 (May 23, 1986). The-retrospective credit amount in
Revenue Ruling 83-66 was determined by the loss experience of the group, and that term
seemed to refer to the medical society, which presumably constituted a subset of the insurer's
business. Therefore, the assertion in the Memorandum quoted above appears to be inaccurate.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
the insured to the insurance company, "because the reserve pre-
ium was available for the losses of the group as a whole." 6 3
Revenue Ruling 83-66 failed to note any disagreement with the
Service's previous positions regarding the insurance characterization
of retrospectively rated contracts. But later developments permitted
a more complete appreciation of this published ruling's attention
to the rating formula's relation to group losses instead of an in-
sured's losses.
The possibility of a Service challenge to deduction of retro
premium expenses always existed despite the absence of any express
objection in the authorities discussed above. A principal function
of a retrospectively rated contract is to bring together the amount
of actual losses and premium expense for the insured. Given this
goal, retros presented a vulnerability that at least some forms of
retros were not "insurance," since a premium determned with fair
closeness by the insured's losses might not shift or distribute risk.
In such cases, the insured effectively bears its own risks as it will
pay its own losses.
This possibility of a challenge became a fact with two 1986
Techmcal Advice Memoranda issued by the Service with respect to
the deductibility of premium expense associated with retros.64 These
memoranda concluded broadly that payments denominated as ret-
rospectively rated premums were not insurance premiums so long
as the amount to be paid is determined by the insured's losses.
The Service's basic position was said to be that "[a]n arrange-
ment constitutes insurance to the extent that it provides for the
risk shifting and risk distribution." 65 The Service then purported to
isolate the basic or excess loss premium, as paid for a true "insur-
ance" function, from the converted losses. The latter figure was a
function of actual losses. The Service stated that the authorities
allow this isolation of "separable elements of the policy" that are
"clearly discernable." 66 It then found that part of the premium that
constituted the "converted losses" was a non-deductible "reserve
63 Rev. Rul. 83-66, 1983-1 C.B. at 44.
6 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-37-003 (May 23, 1986); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003 (June
11, 1986).
6 Id. The authorities cited were the following: Helvenng v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531
(1941); Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950); Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-
2 C.B. 43; Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
6Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003; Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-37-003. The Technical Advice
Memoranda cited for this proposition National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 84
T.C. 509 (1985).
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for losses." It reached this conclusion "even where the funds are
transferred to and administered by an independent agent or by an
insurance company "67 Thus, in one case, the minimum premium
was the most that could be called insurance. Similarly, in the other
case only the basic premiums could be entitled to an insurance
characterization. 69 Other than those amounts, the premium moved
with the losses and could not "to that extent" be seen as insurance
under the Service's approach.
This approach clashed with previous treatment of retros, be-
cause it had generally been thought that a retro with a reasonable
premium adjustment range could be insurance. Retros with unlim-
ited premium adjustment ranges clearly were subject to challenge
regardless of a novel approach such as isolation of the elements of
the contract. In pursuihig a broad plan of attack, the Service ignored
a more restrained and judicious approach not simply with respect
to the issue of insurance characterization. For example, the Service
could have found that the premum expense deduction was not
properly accrued.
In both cases, the Service noted its view was "reinforced" since
the "expected loss portion of the premium became payable only as
specific claims of the taxpayer were asserted and paid by the insur-
ance company "70 That observation undoubtedly supports the Ser-
vice's conclusion as to deductibility, but it also shows that there
was no need for innovation in these cases, such as an attempt to
define insurance. An insurance premium under a retrospectively
rated contract can satisfy the normal tests of accrual deductions. It
may be sufficiently certain so that the fact of liability is established
under the first prong of the "all events" test.71 The prermum
" Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003; Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-37-003. See Spnng Canyon Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 654 (1931).
" This prermum amount might be thought not to constitute a payment for insurance,
since the prermum probably was set so low that payment of losses exceeding that amount
was not uncertain. See infra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
0 The Service's Technical Advice Memoranda described Midwest Motor, discussed
supra note 51, as concerning only the proper tirmng of the deduction. The case was, thus,
said not to be "relevant [in deterrmmng] whetherthe total amounts billed constitute properly
deductible insurance premiums." A characterization of the case as concerning only the timing
of the deduction slights the treatment of the arrangement as insurance by both parties and
the court. That assumption bears on the timing issue and was a natural implication to draw
from Midwest Motor
70 Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003 (June 11, 1986).
7, The potential accrual of retrospectively rated premium expenses draws significant
support from the Midwest Motor case, discussed supra note 51.
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amount, despite variability, can usually be determined with "rea-
sonable accuracy," in accord with the second prong of the "all
events" test.72 In those limited, and avoidable, cases where retro
premium liability depends on a substantial condition the "all events"
test, however, would be unsatisfied. 73 Since the payment of losses
stood as a condition for liability in the two cases considered in the
Under the "all events" test, an accrual liability can be deducted if the fact and amount
of liability can be established. The fact of liability would be fixed with respect to a retro
premium when the insured becomes obligated to pay an insurance premium upon the
execution of the insurance policy. Midwest Motor Express, 27 T.C. 167. See United States
v. Hughes Props, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986) (casino allowed to deduct buildup in "progres-
sive" slot machines as accrued liability); Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund v. United States, 508
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975) (accrued comrmssions deductible despite possible later reduction);
Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Cominussioner, 66 T.C. 436 (1976) (same for accrued rental);
Electric Tachometer Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 158 (1961) (same for accrued moving
expense). See also Geo. K. Herman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 846, 853 (1963)
("An otherwise proper deduction should not be disallowed in the year it was paid or incurred
because of the existence of a possibility that at some future date the taxpayer might receive
a reimbursement therefor."). The premium variability would constitute a condition subse-
quent not precluding a deduction. See Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
214, 217 (2d Cir. 1952) (deduction allowed for commission expenses despite possible failure
to execute final contract and potential variance in commission amount due to quantity), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); Ohmer Reg. Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1942)
(deduction allowed for "reserve for sales agents' commissions" because only contingency
was collection of sales price). On the other hand, an obligation that does not mature into a
liability until the satisfaction of a material condition precedent cannot meet the "all events"
test. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987) (no
deduction for estimates of employees' medical expenses where claims not reported); Field
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 485, 488 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1009 (1966) (no deduction for quality bonuses contingent on delivery acceptance and pay-
ment).
"Reasonable accuracy" in determining the amount of the deduction is needed, not
absolute certainty. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2). Despite the variability of the premium
with retros, extensive practice by insurance companies should permit a sufficiently accurate
projection to support a deduction. Thus, if the stated premium is equal to the projection, it
should be considered properly accrued under the reasonable accuracy prong of the all events
test.
, A contingency may be significant enough to be a condition precedent. Such a
condition would cause the stated premium to fall the "all events" test. W S. Badcock Corp.
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 272, 284 (1972), rev'd, 491 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1974). See Wien
Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 13, 15-16 (1973), aff'd, 528 F.2d 735
(9th Cir. 1976); Buckeye Int'l, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. 376 (1984). This distinction
seems rather artificial and not well adapted to answering these questions, in addition to being
somewhat elusive. See Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting,
4 VA. TAx REv 1, 28-29, 29 n.133 (1984). But the courts use that test in deciding cases.
The retrospectively rated premium should be considered fixed so long as it is not
conditional upon such events as a payment of losses. A condition subsequent, such as losses
lower than those expected, may generate a refund. A refund should be included in income
in the year it becomes determined. See Consolidated-Foods Corp., 66 T.C. 436; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-1(a)(2).
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memoranda, as it stands typically for the paid loss retro, no accrual
deduction was allowable. And that result was absolutely clear under
existing law The Service, however, bypassed such an easier route
in its memoranda.
From the above it should also be clear that the Service paid no
attention to the range of possible premium adjustment in those two
cases. It might have found that the range was not sufficiently
confined to shift or distribute risk. The broad approach, which
ignores the limits on the range of variability, seems designed to
challenge retros with relatively restricted ranges of premium adjust-
ments. If a contract cannot be insurance to the extent the premium
increases together with the losses, then a possible adjustment in the
premium will disqualify a retro's insurance characterization to that
extent. This group of adversely affected plans must necessarily
encompass all retros, even those designed with relatively tight pre-
mium adjustment limits that appear to have definite insurance
elements.
One reason the Service may have bypassed these less controver-
sial or innovative rationales might have been to facilitate a forth-
coming attack on all retros, including even those with relatively
tight premium adjustment ranges. If a court can be convinced to
disallow the insurance premium expense deductions for a paid loss
retro simply due to the presence of retrospective rating, the Service
can expand its attack m subsequent cases. That is how the Service
litigated the captive insurance cases. Its litigation strategy called for
establishment of a broad principle in the weaker captive cases before
turning to the stronger cases in which the argument for insurance
treatment was more plausible. 74 The Service's memoranda, of course,
failed to specify whether the new approach to retros would be
followed to its logical extreme, but some contracts previously thought
to be insurance would clearly not be so characterized under the
new approach.75
74 See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 5, at 220-26.
" At one time, the Service seemed prepared for a broad challenge to retros and other
cash flow programs in connection with the promulgation of regulations implementing the
economic performance standard of I.R.C. § 461(h). The possibility was that the regulations
rmght attempt to define insurance to exclude retro arrangements and other cash flow pro-
grams.
This possibility was suggested from the legislative materials accompanying the 1984 Act
provisions concermng funded employee welfare benefit plans and the temporary regulations
that were issued to implement this legislation. As a part of that legislation, I.R.C. § 419
curtails the deductions with respect to contributions to various employee welfare benefit
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The strategy to reach insurance arrangements with more tightly
designed features, such as fixed payment provisions, is also clear
from the new proposed economic performance regulations. In the
past, a fixed liability to an insurer generally achieved a current
deduction under the accrual rules of the "all events" test as related
above. The economic performance requirement that was added to
the "all events" test in 1984 provided a third requirement for
deduction of an accrued liability. Although according to the legis-
lative history, the economic performance test, which generally de-
layed deductibility of accrued losses, is met in the year of the policy
period for an arrangement that constitutes insurance, 76 the proposed
regulations provide that for liabilities under an insurance contract
"economic performance occurs as payment is made to the person
to which the liability is owed." ' 77 This means that if an insurance
policy covers the 1991 year and payment is made in 1993, then the
deduction for the premium occurs in the later year with economic
performance, and the regulations suggest further difficulties for a
current deduction with respect to the retro premium amount even
if actually paid to the insurer because there may be a refund to the
taxpayer insured. 78 The deductibility of the premium expense under
the deferred prermum retro would, thus, clearly be delayed until
funds. Where it applies that provision puts the taxpayer-employer on the cash method for
contributions to such funds, making those amounts deductible as paid to such funds. There
were quickly indications that this concept included retro arrangements for employee benefits
within the scope of such funds. Jenson, The Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions
for Accrual-Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L. REv. 229, 262 n.138 (1988). See Joint Committee
on Taxation, General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit-Reduction Act
of 1984, at 777-78 (December 31, 1984) (funds so limited include contracts purchased by
employers from insurance compames if subject to retrospective adjustment). The § 419
Temporary Regulations followed this pattern. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.419-iT.
The Proposed Regulations under I.R.C. § 461(h), however, did not offer a general
definition of insurance that would sweep up retros in this manner. Instead the Regulations
would adopt the definition of insurance applicable under I.R.C. § 162. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-4(g)(5) (June 7, 1990). As discussed in the text, the economic performance Proposed
Regulations did, however, reach a similar result to that provided under the § 419 regulations
by a different route as they would greatly affect some retro arrangements by provisions
delaying premium expense deductions when the premium payment is deferred until a later
period.
76 H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, supra note 51, at 875.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(5) (June 7, 1990).
7 Prop. Treas: Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(8) (ex. 7) (June 7, 1990). It is, moreover, doubtful
that current cash payment of an investment credit retro prermum would constitute "payment"
that is required for economic performance. Id. § 1.461-4(g)(5). Although the regulations do
not define insurance, they define "payment" to exclude "an amount transferred as a
refundable deposit, or contingent payment with respect to which the taxpayer may be, or
become, entitled to receive a refund or credit." Id. § 1.461-4(g)(1)(ii)(A).
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the actual payment by the insured to the insurer, even though the
note firmly specified fixed terms for payment, rather than merely
calling for payment by the insured as losses are paid under some
of the more loosely designed plans.
The proposed regulations' approach shows again a very broad
strategy and further confirms that retros with fixed premium ranges
could face wide-ranging attack as suggested above. This approach,
just as the definition of insurance in the techmcal advice memo-
randa, adopts a position broader than that needed to stop taxpayer
abuse in these plans.
4. Relationship of the Service's Position to Trends in Tax Area
The Service's aggressive and expansive stance regarding the
premium expense deduction with respect to retros follows the strict
treatment accorded other cash flow programs. The prime examples
of that sort are the captive insurance companies. Taxpayers in
litigated cases have virtually without exception failed in attempts to
deduct captive premium expenses. 79 In recent years, the doctrine
emerging from captive cases suggests a line of attack for the Service
with respect to retros.
The Ninth Circuit's opimon in Clougherty Packing Co. v
CommissionersO articulates well the government's position on the
captive insurance issue. In Clougherty, a parent company bought a
policy from its subsidiary that was a captive insurance company
The court found this not to be insurance, because of its relation to
the purported insured's assets. Using a form of the "economic
family" theory, a concept used by the Service to aggregate the
finances of all members of a corporate group when challenging
captive insurance premium expense deduction, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the insured-parent's assets to see if there was risk
shifting or, in other words, if the parent had "divested itself of the
adverse economic consequences of a covered . claim.""' Of
course, the parent's holdings would decline in value when covered
losses are paid because the assets are then leaving the subsidiary as
payment of losses to unrelated parties. Since net worth of the parent
would be adversely affected despite the "insurance" arrangement,
"See supra note 9.
811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987).
11 Id. at 1305.
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the court concluded that the arrangement effected no risk shifting
and, therefore, it was not insurance.1
2
These words might be literally applicable to retros. If amounts
paid to an insurance company fail to protect from losses an asserted
insured's assets in the form of its net worth, then those amounts
do not constitute insurance premiums. With premiums largely var-
ying with the losses, one might conclude that the "insured" is not
insured to that extent because payment of such losses will cause its
net worth to decline. This approach isolates the elements of the
arrangement into insurance and non-insurance. The approach of
the Service as indicated in its technical advice memoranda may be
the manner in which courts will approach the retro issue, if the
captive cases are any guide."3
5. Alternatives to the Service's Emerging Approach to Retros
This set of authorities and the possible conclusions that may
follow inaccurately treat many forms of retros. Some retros, per-
haps most that are currently used in practice, might not be insurance
if fairly evaluated. But all retros should not be subjected to this
aggressive treatment. In addition, the grounds of challenging the
more loosely structured arrangements, that contain only marginal
insurance elements, could benefit from a more restrained and ju-
dicious approach.
The best stated guidelines for a reasonable approach to this
issue are found in Revenue Ruling 67-225. As discussed above,
that ruling contained the notion that a retrospectively rated insur-
ance policy or contract "subject to minimum and maximum limits
guarantee[s] on the one end, that every premium paid by a
policyholder takes into account the risk charges and loading ele-
ments and on the other end that the contract is one of insurance
rather than mere bookkeeping for a fee."18 5 This treatment was
obviously imprecise, but it contained sufficient guidance, consistent
with other authorities dealing with the concept of insurance such
as are discussed above, that some analysis of the situation could
" Id. at 1306.
" The Ninth Circuit stated that, "Le Gierse requires that an insurance arrangement
negate any effect of a covered loss on the insured party's assets." Clougherty Packing Co.
v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court might have intended
an even more harsh result for insureds seeking a deduction than is suggested in the text.
14 1967-2 C.B. 238, revoked on other grounds, Rev. Rul. 73-302, 1973-2 C.B. 220.
"Id. at 239.
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proceed, even if some parts of the analysis were-not particularly
clear.
a. Defining Insurance
One approach to this issue is to define insurance more precisely
That approach would be consistent with the courts' numerous at-
tempts to define insurance in the captive context.8 6 It is also the
preferred course of a leading commentator, who has counseled in
favor of such a resolution of such difficult tax questions and against
broad anti-tax avoidance reasoning. 87
The history of retrospectively rated contracts gives us guidance
in arriving at a proper definition of insurance. The long acceptance
of retrospectively rated contracts as some form of insurance shows
that at some point these contracts can amount to insurance."8 It
would be inexplicable for the Service, Treasury, and courts to
assume that retro plans are insurance contracts for other purposes,
only to conclude that they are not when considering the deductibility
of amounts to be paid as insurance premiums. This result would
be further surprising since for years it had been assumed that the
premium expenses under retro contracts were generally deductible.8 9
The difficulties with a purely definitional approach, however,
quickly overwhelm the prospect of relying upon it too greatly First,
insurance theorists are not particularly clear or consistent about the
nature of retrospectively rated contracts, as their comments have
ranged from calling it insurance to quasi self-insurance. 9° Second,
the definitions from these authorities never get any more precise
than that found in Revenue Ruling 67-225 with its reference to
reasonable mimmum and maximum premium limits. Thus, simply
defining "insurance" with respect to retrospectively rated contracts
has its limits, and the tax law will require some further scrutiny of
the issue.
Moreover, a strictly definitional approach would be too limited
to be satisfying. If the parties to the contract were to set the
minimum and maximum premiums to provide for some miniscule
amount of risk distribution and risk shifting, then it would be
possible to state that elements of insurance are present and argue,
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
"See Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MIcn. L. Ray. 733, 757 (1978).
" See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
" See Note, supra note 15, at 800.
0See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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therefore, that the contract should be considered to be one of
insurance. But this manipulation would not be suggested by any
neutral commentator and hopefully would not be respected by the
courts. Perhaps someone suggesting a definitional approach would
assume that some such further analysis would be appropriate, but
specifying the further step would be helpful.
b. Economic Reality or Substance
It seems likely that this issue requires that the analysis advance
to the level of testing the economic substance of the arrangement,
rather than just its form. The tax law has long preferred substance
over form in its anti-tax avoidance doctrnes. 91 If retrospectively
rated contracts are in substance found to constitute insurance, then
the tax law should allow the deduction.
The standard, derived from Revenue Ruling 67-225 and the
general insurance theory authorities, that premium adjustments be
confined failed to determine what size of adjustment contraints
would be meaningful or substantial. The limitation must, it seems
clear, have some realistic or substantial relation to the risks covered.
If the insured's losses could not, even in the worst case, exceed
twice the stated premium, a maximum premium of five times the
stated premium would not be a substantial limit. That limit would
lack substance or meaning. With no significant possibility of losses
exceeding the maximum premium, the insurer bears no risk. In that
case, the contract would not shift risk and would-not be, substan-
tially, msurance. 92
In addition, if the mimmum premium covered only little more
than administrative costs and was far lower than any recent loss
experience, insurance features rmght again seem absent in terms of
substance. In such a case, the insured would be unlikely to pay
more in premiums than it has losses, such that its prenuums could
be used to cover the losses of others. 93 A contract containing such
'1 See Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue
Code, 21 How. L. J. 693 (1978); Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance,
51 MicH. L. Ray 1021 (1953). See also Winslow, supra note 9, at 112-21.
92 See Note, supra note 15, at 802.
" Some insurance scholars see this as the function of the rmmmum premium. See H.
DmcmEao, supra note 29, at 389-90 ("The minmum premium provides for the expenses
of the insurer and a contingency factor, with funds obtained from the latter being used to
pay insureds whose losses exceed their maximum prermums."). Tis statement may constitute
the unspoken assumption that the basic premium is part of the nmmunum premium. It has
elsewhere been observed that, "[t]he net insurance charge [or basic premium] is necessary
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a mimmum premium might be considered to lack a risk-distribution
element. 94
Absent economic substance or reality, a retro arrangement would
not support a finding of risk shifting and risk distribution. Thus,
a retro contract, to be considered insurance, must allow for a
significant chance that losses will be greater than, the level corre-
sponding with the maximum premium, or will be less than the level
corresponding with the mimmum premium. So structured some
retros could be brought within the definition of insurance under
the general insurance authorities in existence prior to the Service's
technical advice memoranda.
This reasoning helps by disposing of many of the weaker retro
variants, as does the definitional approach. For example, it is clear
that, whether analyzed as a whole or in part and whether analyzed
from a definitional approach or from a more substantive approach,
certain arrangements labelled as retrospectively rated insurance are
only self-insurance. If all losses are paid by the insurance company
in exchange for a variable premium that increases directly with
losses, substantial risk shifting is lacking. The paid loss retro with
no limits on the premium variability would fail tins test for sub-
stantial risk shifting as it also would fail a definitional approach.
Such an arrangement is economically identical to self-insurance and
should be treated as such.95 Such a scheme was analyzed in Steere
Tank Lmes v United States,9 which found no risk shifting and
therefore no insurance.
Furthermore, an analysis of the substance of the arrangement
also should dispose of additional retro variants that are slightly
better designed, or one might say somewhat better disguised. A
similar result should be expected where there is no significant chance
that losses will lie outside the bounds of the premium adjustment
range. In such instances, the contracts would substantially fail to
because the prenum gamed on those who pay the nummum premium is always less than
the premium lost on those who pay the maximum prenuum." Williams, supra note 29, at
399. As discussed more fully below, unless the minmum premium, less the basic premium,
represents an amount that may with some significant probability exceed the insured's losses,
the insurance character of the arrangement may be jeopardized, but that would be on account
of a reason other than the lack of risk distribution. See also infra note 110.
'4 Insubstantially low mimmum premiums may impair the deduction, despite other
insurance aspects of the plan. Such a premium suggests that there is no current liability for
the prermum. Losses then become a condition precedent to liability.
See Spring Canyon Coal Co., 43 F.2d 78. See also I.R.C. § 461(a).
- 577 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978).
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shift risky Thus, a great many contracts superficially denominated
as insurance contracts and purporting to have limits on premium
adjustments would not be accorded insurance characterization.
These suggestions support to this point the Service's conclusions
because they would result in disallowance of the premium expense
deduction where a retro specifies an effectively unlimited adjustment
of the premium. The two Technical Advice Memoranda in which
the Service announced its position involved such arrangements. In
such a situation, the taxpayer, in substance, has failed to purchase
insurance under virtually any even-handed analysis.
But for retros with further refinements and substance, a differ-
ent conclusion should prevail. If the contract confines premiums,
the premium does not simply move with losses, because marginal
adjustments of the premium on account of converted losses occur
only within a small area. With the narrowing of the adjustment
range, a retro should begin to take on overall insurance features at
some point, even if it is not clear precisely where that point lies.
An emphasis on substance provides a needed amendment to the
Service's position. Some entire plans should be characterized as
"insurance." Those arrangements to be analyzed as a whole must
be those which are naturally tied together by the economics of their
terms. That result should obtain for an insured who can show that
it has purchased more than excess coverage of only catastrophic
losses, with all other losses self-insured. Such a showing should be
possible for contracts that stand as a whole from the perspective
of economic substance. This conclusion would appear justified for
cases where the minimum premium, excluding the amount repre-
senting the basic premium, constitutes a significant amount that
may not be outdistanced by the losses. If that probability is suffi-
ciently great that an insured would not have agreed to pay that
amount without also purchasing the excess coverage, then the con-
tract should stand as an indivisible whole. In any event, the maxi-
mum premium also must be fixed at a sufficiently small amount
that losses may with some substantial possibility exceed that amount
or no risk shifts.
With variability of premiums declining, an isolation of the
elements of the contract loses its credibility As the minmum pre-
mum rises, an insured would ultimately balk at entering such an
agreement absent the coverage of the losses beyond an excess amount.
'" Those defimng "insurance" in this context might suggest that the presence of
substantial risk shifting is an implicit part of their analysis as described above.
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A very low nmmum premium may make that aspect of the contract
separable from the excess coverage. On the other hand, a rmnimum
premium set at a meaningful high level should not be separated
from the rest of the policy Such a contract should be examined in
its entirety for nsk-shifting because the elements would be econom-
ically tied together by an insured purchasing it.98
This approach will present questions of fact regarding the prob-
ability of risk-shifting and the economic unity of the contract as a
whole. It may not be susceptible to a bright line approach. This
analysis does not provide a natural guideline for determining when,
for example, a significant amount of risk shifting exists under a
contract. Disagreements over the proper amount to be classified as
significant will arise.
c. Business Purpose vs. Tax Avoidance
Some may see no need to go further in analyzing retros. But
another concept from the tax law might offer a further glimmer of
light even if it is a fairly aggressive anti-tax avoidance doctrine.
The tax law contains a further anti-tax avoidance doctrine, the
business purpose requirement, which may be instructive on this
issue. Without a purpose other than the tax avoidance, a transaction
is not treated according to its form. 99 The author previously has
argued that would-be insurance transactions (captive insurance ar-
rangements in particular)' °° might be analyzed more aggressively for
tax purposes by comparing the sufficiency of magnitude of the non-
tax or business purpose of the transaction against its potential for
tax avoidance. 101
The commentators have often criticized the business purpose
doctrine.102 Additionally, it has recently been described as obsolete
in light of the availability of the economic reality and substance
tests. 103 But the concept of business purpose can be helpful in
framing the tax issue for retros.
" See Davis, supra note 14, at 38.
" See B. BrrTKER & J. EUsTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORAIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 1.05 (5th ed. 1987).
,00 In that instance, the arrangements were captive insurance schemes.
"I See Winslow, supra note 9, at 134-37.
0 See Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law
to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuL. L. R-v. 355 (1963); Summers, A Critique of the Business-
Purpose Doctrine, 41 OR. L. REv. 38 (1961); Note, The Business Purpose Doctrine: The
Effect of Motive on Federal Income Tax Liability, 49 FORDHAM L. RaV. 1078 (1981). See
also Winslow, supra note 9, at 115, 117 n.160.
"I Moore, The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach
to Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REv. 659, 678-83 (1989).
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The business purpose doctrine provides a general framework
for analyzing the insurance characterization of retro contracts. If
the tax effect for the would-be insured in accelerating the tax
deduction predominates over the business effect of securing insur-
ance, then the deduction for the premium expense might be demed
under that analysis. 04 In order to make some suggestions, it is
necessary to explore both effects more fully ,
The possible tax avoidance for the would-be insured in a retro
contract lies in the acceleration of the deduction for the underlying
liabilities. If there is no insurance, an accrual taxpayer could take
a deduction for such liabilities after the "all events" test is satisfied
and economic performance has occurred, which for workers' com-
pensation and tort liabilities would occur only when the claimant
is actually paid.105 To avoid being put on that form of the cash
method, a taxpayer may seek to use a cash flow program, such as
a retro, in order to .generate a current accrual deduction for pre-
mium expense. Because a present value deduction can be the eco-
nomic equivalent of a future value deduction in a later year, 0 there
might be no great harm in this if the earlier amount were properly
discounted. Prior to the 1986 reforms directed at insurance company
taxation, there might have been some doubt about whether the
premium would have accurately reflected such a discount because
the-insurance company might have been willing to trade some of
its special tax advantages under Subchapter L in inflating the cur-
rent premium expense amount' °7 and adjusting the payment terms
to make the arrangement financially attractive to the insured. The
1986 Act largely removed the preferential tax treatment accorded
insurers under Subchapter L, so any former abuse should also
largely be gone.0 8 Following that Act, insurance brokers have claimed
that the former financial leeway evaporated as a result of the 1986
reforms and transactions largely should be based on the business
economics. Thus, retro arrangements exanined under this analysis
should not cause great concern about abuse.
This background suggests that moderate amounts of insurance
elements should suffice to sustain the form of the retro arrange-
10 See Winslow, supra note 9, at 134-37.
"I See I.R.C. § 461(a), (h); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2).
'0 See Bradley & Winslow, supra note 5; Jensen, The Supreme Court and the Timing
of Deductions for Accrual-Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L. REv. 229 (1988).
,o7 See Winslow, supra note 9, at 89-92.
,08 See id. at 132-34.
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ment. If there were still the possibility of substantial abuse, it might
have been necessary to insist that the premium range be set to
provide at least a twenty-five percent chance that the losses will be
less than and exceed the amounts corresponding to the minimum
or maximum premiums, respectively Given that the large numbers
of risks at issue mean aggregate losses can be predicted with good
accuracy, these suggested constraints would impose a very narrow
premium range of variability upon plans designed to generate pre-
mium expense deductions. The suggested constraints would mean
that half or more of the time some element of insurance (risk
distribution or risk shifting) would likely be borne out. In the
situation since the 1986 Act, more moderate levels might be toler-
ated. If the minmum and maximum premiums are set such that
there is at least a ten percent chance on either end that the losses
will lie outside the range of premium variability (exclusive of the
basic premium), then the concern discussed above should be satis-
fied.'09 This figure provides a realistic and significant chance that
the insurer will cover unreimbursed losses, and reflects a substantial
mimmum premium that one would think would be unlikely to be
paid m the absence of the coverage on the upper end."0 At that
point one can conclude that there is the significant business effect
in shifting substantial risk as a counter balance to the acceleration
of the tax deduction.
d. Final Thoughts: The Service's Segregation of Contract
Components
The Service's current campaign regarding retros is novel because
of its dividing the contract into various elements. The Service's
reasoning begins with the assertion that an "arrangement constitutes
insurance to the extent that it provides for risk shifting and risk
distribution.""1 ' This statement means that the part of an arrange-
11 This does not mean that the probabilities must necessarily be equal on either end. It
may be that insureds and insurers would not perceive this to be a dollar for dollar trade off
at either end in order to achieve the suggested linkage and unification of the entire contract.
110 Although this is not an intended goal, this formula and suggested probabilities likely
would result in the characterization of the vast majority of currently operative retro programs
as "non-insurance." Insurers have been reluctant to accept significant nsks at the upper end
and insureds similarly have resisted significant minimum premiums. See Davis, supra note
14, at 38. This has meant that the limits are set with probabilities being infinitesimally small
in almost all cases, with almost completely free variability.
" Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003 (June 11, 1986); Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-37-003 (May 23,
1986).
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ment contaimng these elements constitutes insurance. The remaimng
portion would not be insurance. This approach is both revolutionary
and misguided.
The insurance tax authorities fail to support this approach. If
risk shifting is present, the arrangement is insurance; if not, it is
not insurance.112 The Le Gierse Court examined the entire arrange-
ment as a whole for its substance because the separate contracts in
that case would not have been made independently 113 Retros should
be examned similarly Significant risk shifting present in a plan
that is econonically unified, as described above, should support an
insurance characterization. 1 4 That suggested approach is consistent
with numerous theoretical insurance authorities that have regarded
retros as insurance, despite premium variability 115 The Service's
position simply ignores the theoretical literature not in accord with
its views.
The Service's approach is the sort that will involve tax analysis
of inappropriate questions. If a contract is not analyzed as a whole
where appropriate and under the modern conceptions of insurance,
then the tax law will be drawn into the minutiae of arrangements
m an attempt to scrutinize and label each part as insurance or non-
insurance. The current hair-splitting that proceeds unabated in the
captive area should be sufficient incentive to caution against such
a course."
6
,,2 See Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531; Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288; Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2
C.B. 43; Rev. Rul. 77-316; 1977-2 C.B. 53. In Treganowan the court concluded that the
arrangement was insurance and made no mention of a separation of the contract into
insurance and non-insurance components. Le Gierse stated the now often quoted test that
"[h]istoncally and commonly insurance involves nsk-shifting and nsk-distributing." Le Gierse,
312 U.S. at 539. The Court found that "the contracts [at issue] wholly failled] to spell out
any element of insurance risk." Id. at 541. All that was required was an element of risk-
shifting and nsk-distribution. The Service later recogmzed this when, in Rev. Rul. 60-275, it
stated that, "an element of risk-shifting or [sic] risk-distributing is one of the requisites of a
true insurance contract." 1960-2 C.B. at 45. Thus, these authorities do not treat an arrange-
ment as insurance "to the extent" it shifts and distributes risk. Rather, insurance is either
present in or absent from the arrangement depending on whether it contains these elements.
"I Le Gierse, 312 U.S. at 540.
"4 There is some authority for segregating portions of a life insurance contract into
term and other forms of life insurance. See National Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,
84 T.C. 509, 545-49 (1985). The property/casualty insurance area apparently has not devel-
oped such authority. And in the life insurance area contrary authority would treat parts of
a contract as inseparable if they would not be sold or purchased separately. See Moseley v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 183, 187-88 (1979).
"I See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
116 See authorities cited supra note 9.
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One nught claim that contrary to tis criticism, the Service's
position actually achieves a cleaner result. It rmght provide a rea-
sonably clear line: the variable portion of the arrangement does not
generate a premium expense deduction and the fixed portion does.
But the Service's view on insurance may not be that simple, and if
further statements by the Service are treated seriously and explored
fully these complications appear. The Service stated that the variable
premium beyond the mnmmum or basic premium could not under
any circumstance be an insurance premium and hence would always
be non-deductible. The Service also stated that the taxpayer may
otherwise establish that amounts payable under the contract are
"attributable to the insurance elements of the arrangement,"1117
apparently referring to the nonvanable part of the amounts billed
under the contract. Thus, it is not clear that those fixed amounts
necessarily represent deductible insurance premiums.
In addition, other statements by the Service imply a further
potential limitation on deductions for insurance premium expenses.
The Service stated that due to the pooling process an insurer is able
to accept each loss "for the group as a whole, so as to enable the
insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability
upon it." 'n This suggests that an insurance premium constitutes a
small fraction of the amount of potential losses covered by the
policy
These suggestions greatly resemble an issue that has been posed
in the captive area where large insureds also predominate."19 Some
writers have interpreted the Tax Court's opinion in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Commissoner'20 to mean that a captive can insure its affiliates
if it does more than half of its business outside its corporate group.
This Gulf Oil dicta rmght be a bright line test for determimng
whether the captive arrangement is insurance."1' Some commenta-
tors have discounted that possibility for an insured with enough
risks to achieve pooling among its risks alone, because the actual
losses should not exceed by much those expected to occur. 22 That
" Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-38-003 (June 11, 1986).
Tech. Adv. Mem. 86-37-003 (May 23, 1986).
119 See Winslow, supra note 9, at 159-62.
--o 89 T.C. 1010 (1987).
"I See Abramowitz & Allen, Rev. Rul. 88-72 v. Gulf Oil-The Tax Court Should
Reaffirm that Unrelated Risks Can Make a Difference, 43 TAx NoTEs 325, at 333 (1989);
Bradley & Taten, When Will Premiums Paid to Captive Insurers Be Deductible?, 68 J. TAX'N
296, 298 (1988).
" See Bradley & Taten, supra note 121, at 298 n. l.
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interpretation would greatly limit the effect of the Gulf Oil language
and would restrict the ability of a taxpayer with a great number of
risks to insure with an affiliate.12
This notion of insurance taken from the Service's Techmcal
Advice Memoranda and other commentators focuses on a large
difference between the premium charged and the potential losses.
Insureds with negligible or small losses would allow for insureds
with high losses by paying a premium in excess of such negligible
or small losses. In the insurance company's collection of premiums,
risk spreading or distributing occurs from insureds with high loss
payments to those more fortunate insureds with loss payments less
than expected. These views turn on a view that a large difference
in the amount of losses exists among the numerous insureds. The
majority of insureds would have fairly light loss payments and a
small number would be visited with high losses. An insurance
company covering a large group of insureds and thus bearing a
vast aggregation of risks can predict its aggregate loss payment with
far greater accuracy than anyone can predict the losses of any
insured. An insurance company, thus, can set its premium at a level
far below that of the losses visited upon the unluckiest insureds.
A sizeable insured utilizing a retro could not purchase insurance
under these notions, if pursued to their logical extreme. These
notions suggest that the bulk of the minimum premium that is
subject to a reasonable lower limit cannot be paid for insurance.
The business will certainly (in a statistical sense) be required to pay
substantial sums as loss payments approaching the premium and,
therefore, the losses covered are not the maturing of risks. Insurance
covers only uncertain losses that can be called risks, not matters
that are certain.1 z4 To the extent the minimum' premium covers
certain items it is not insurance.
The notion that a premium payment typically constitutes a
"slight fraction of the risk"' 5 is inappropriate to apply to large
insurance contracts for reasons similar to those suggesting that risk
distribution among insureds is no longer a necessary element of
insurance.12 Risk distribution among insureds was long ago neces-
sary as a part of group coverage to adjust an individual insured's
premium costs into line with the average loss. The presence of large
"I See Winslow, supra note 9, at 159.
4 See A. WInxr, supra note 1, at 79 (insurance covers only uncertain losses).
'2 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
"2 See Winslow, supra note 9, at 150-58.
[VoL. 79
RETROSPECTIVELY RATED INSURANCE
numbers of insureds and the accompanying risk distribution reduced
uncertainty The grouping of insureds produced the numbers nec-
essary to achieve some certainty for the benefit of all parties, a
primary object of insurance. Some insureds paid more in premiums
than they had losses and others experienced far greater losses than
their prenuums. Such collateral characteristics of insurance in. the
past should not determine the required elements of insurance today
Insurance transactions today can be much larger and the risks of
any one insured nught, as an aggregate, reach a size enabling a
reasonable prediction of its losses. In addition, it has been observed
by an insurance theorist that the concept of insurance does not
require that the premium be a small portion of the amount of the
risk, even if that is typically the relationship observed.' 27 There are
cases where the premium constitutes a sizeable part of the amount
of the risk.'2
Analyzing large business insurance transactions to see whether
the premium is a "slight fraction" of the covered risks will extend
this challenge to insurance characterization beyond retro programs.
Any large insured with a significant number of risks has smlilar
vulnerability, including those purchasing policies where the premium
is fixed and not subject to retrospective adjustment. This extension
is possible because the simple view of insurance, with a premium
typically being a small fraction of the risk covered, is not adapted
to cases covering thousands of risks. For a large business, the bulk
of losses are not really uncertain. For such an insured it will not
be possible to have a prermum equal to a slight fraction of the
possible losses. If the notion that an insurance premium is a small
fraction of possible losses is extended, then the bulk of a fixed
premium policy would be non-insurance. 29
A contrary result given the adoption of such a notion is difficult
to conceive but perhaps plausible. A large insured could be concep-
tualized as paying a premium apportioned among the multitude of
covered risks. For example, a business insuring 25,000 automobiles
could envision its premium as divided among the 25,000 units in
comparing its situation to an individual insured, who as one of
thousands of insureds, has insured a single automobile. For such a
I Id. at 161 n.329 (citing H. Denenberg, What Constitutes Insurance Within the
Meaning of the Law (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis)).
8 Id. (Denenberg notes one example where the premium was sixty percent of the
potential loss).
229 Cf. A. Wlsm=r, supra note I, at 79 (insurance covers only uncertain losses).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JouNAL[O
large insured, each part of the premium so apportioned would be
a slight fraction of the corresponding potential loss. This type of
analysis is artificial, stilted and should be unnecessary for the
reasons discussed above but it at least provides a plausible way to
reconcile this notion of a premium being a slight fraction of the
covered risk with large insurance contracts.
The most sound approach would not make such fine distinctions
regarding insurance and would not segregate the components of
policies if the arrangement is economically whole. That is the pur-
pose of the examination of the minmum premium amount. Once
it is determined that the arrangement is economically a single trans-
action, the entire retro arrangement should be analyzed for signif-
icant risk shifting. If that is found in the level suggested above, the
contract should be treated as insurance. 130
Finally, the Service's choice in focusing on retros from the
insured's side is remarkable. Insurance with respect to insurers
should include as much risk shifting as for the insureds. A full
examination of insurance concepts logically should proceed with
respect to compames in that business. A study of the nature of
insurance would be much more likely revealing if industry practices
were the subjects rather than isolated contracts of "insureds."
To be eligible for taxation under the principles of Subchapter
L, insurers must demonstrate that they are predominantly in the
' There is an alternative definition of insurance in this context. This view represents a
possibility, but one should hesitate to offer it as a primary choice for several reasons.
This view centers on the insured's obligation to pay a premium (albeit variable in sum)
amount and the insurer's obligation to pay covered claims. This contrasts with the self-
insurance situation where there is no current deduction because nothing is paid as the liability
is not fixed and the amount is probably not determinable with reasonable accuracy. With a
retro, the accrual of the liability to the insurer replaces the self-insured's uncertainty of its
liability. It also consolidates the liabilities and ends the basic contest as to liability. With a
limited range for premium adjustment it also can be argued that the amount can be
determined with reasonable accuracy.
The principal issue would seem to be whether the type of contract described changes
the liability from that which it would be without the arrangement with the insurer. One
could argue, with some support in the theoretical literature, that the presence of the insurer
as the source of indemnification merits an insurance characterization. See C. KuraP, supra
note 37, at 523; R. GosHAY, supra note 3, at 42. But that conclusion seems overbroad. Even
those who seem to state this test ultimately appear to rely on the presence of a maximum-
mimmum premium range for the conclusion. See C. KuirP, supra note 37, at 519. Addition-
ally, the case law, as described above, seems to be generally accepted as foreclosing this
argument by finding that a retro arrangement without limits is not insurance even though
claims against an insolvent business still could be paid by the insurer. See Steere Tank Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 76-2 U.S.T.C. 9526 (N.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd per curtain, 577 F.2d
279 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979).
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insurance business. A challenge on this point may make the Ser-
vice's position less tenable when considering a entire insurance
company But this course has not been pursued, probably because
a challenge of that sort has a lesser likelihood of success. Since
retro plans constitute the predominant insurance for large busi-
nesses, a promnent insurer may not be in the insurance business
under the Service's current notions of insurance. An attempt to
recharacterize a significant portion of the insurance industry may
not be acceptable and it may be similarly unlikely that the Service
could succeed in recharacterizing even a significant portion of its
business, even if no insurer will be found to be operating predom-
mantly some other type of business.
CONCLUSION
There recently has been a tendency to overanalyze the term
"insurance." This overly sensitive approach probably has resulted
from the tax law historically placing too much importance on the
characterization of a transaction as insurance for deduction pur-
poses and perhaps for Subchapter L purposes. It is unwise for the
term "insurance" to bear so great a load or for insurance to be
treated much differently from other types of businesses.
A defimtion of insurance for federal tax purposes can draw
reasonable lines based on current and well established theoretical
literature that looks for reasonable amounts of nsk shifting m the
contract. Stilted interpretations should be avoided for the numerous
difficulties that will follow Analysis of insurance contracts such as
retros should be in terms of economic substance and the other
familiar tax doctrines, rather than an overly involved definitional
approach. If properly followed, tis approach will not permit tax-
payer abuse. The clear abuses would be ended without causing the
tax law to enter troublesome areas.
The insurance tax issues concerning retros as well as other
insurance arrangements have already been handled in several ways.
The retrospectively rated plans 131 were once inordinately attractive
to taxpayers because of their ability to trade on the entitlement of
insurance compames to the Subchapter L benefits. The proper focus
for changes was to these benefits and the 1986 Act significantly cut
back on those advantages. If the tax treatment of insurance com-
panies is relatively level compared to other businesses, that source
"I See Davis, supra note 14.
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of abuse should not exist. If further adjustments along the line
attempted m 1986 are needed, then attention should again be di-
.rected to Subchapter L.
Similarly, some of the plans described above involve deferred
payments that can present an abuse, for example, if the premium
amount is overstated and the interest element of the deferred pay-
ments is understated. This possibility should be controlled by di-
recting attention to the time value of money, as was done by the
1984 Act and its numerous provisions imputing interest m a variety
of contexts.1 2 Again, tinkering with the defimtion of insurance was
not necessary to correct the abuse. Nor would it seem necessary to
put all deferred premium payments on the cash method as has been
done with the proposed regulations implementing the accrual ac-
counting standard of economic performance.
A particularized focus on the source of the problem is much
preferred. It goes to the root of the issue rather than treating the
symptoms of the problem by ad hoc definitions of the term insur-
ance or by broad brush treatment of insurance transactions as
somehow different from other business transactions. If such an
approach is followed and appreciated, it might be possible to avoid
leaning so heavily on a definition of insurance, once the objection-
able aspects of the transaction are removed.
The Government's continued fascination with insurance ar-
rangements is unwarranted. There is no reason for all purchasers
of insurance with a deferred premium arrangement where the pay-
ments are fixed according to a note to be required to account for
that purchase on a cash basis. Nor should all retros be lumped
together on the characterization of them as insurance. Rather, the
tax law should attempt to sort the good from the bad under the
guidelines described above.
13. See I.R.C. §§ 467, 1271-1275, 7872.
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